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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION,
D. H. Whittenburg, Chairman, H. J.
Corleissen and Layton Maxfield,
Members of the ENGINEERING
COMMISSION,
Appellant and Plaintiff,
Case No. 8290
vs.
BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES
D. WIMAN, Trustees under the Will
and of the Estate of CHARLES H.
DEERE, Deceased,
Respondents and Defendants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by the State of Utah to
condemn property for "This Is The Place" Monument
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Park. (R. 1-20) Respondents' property was "actually
taken" by Final Judgment of Condemnation duly made,
entered and recorded May 27, 1952. (R. 43-51)

On appeal by respondents from the money judgment
first entered determining the value of respondents'
property so taken, the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court with direction to grant a new trial in a decision
by Wade, J., reported as State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265
P. 2d 630.

On re-trial, the judgment from which appeal is now
taken was entered November 5, 1954 (R. 97-99) on the
jury's verdict as to the only issues of fact presented
below, that is, as to the fair market values of the items
of respondents' property taken by the Final Judgment
of Condemnation. On this appeal the State now raises
two major questions of law pertaining to the trial court's
rulings as to evidence and instructions, asserting the
alleged errors to be fatal to the verdict and judgment
entered thereon.

The first of these major contentions concerns the
fair market value of Parcel 1 (Ex. 1). This was the
completed subdivision described in the court's Pretrial Order. (R, 52) At the second trial, experts for
appellant valued Parcel 1 at $163,250.00, $148,883.00,
and $169,000.00. (R. 366, 437,474) Those for respondents
valued it as $310,000.00, $302,000.00, and $309,700.00, re-
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spectively. (R. 182, 238, 270.) The jury found the fair
market value of Parcel 1 on July 12, 1951 to be $260,100.00. (R. 93)

As stated in Appellant's Brief, the wide disparity
in the expert opinions as to value was the result of the
application of different appraisal methods by the
opposing experts. Experts for the State relied upon and
applied the "income" (R. 351), or the "residual" (R.
426), or the "summation" (R. 477, 491) approach. In
their opinion, as experts, that was the most appropriate
formula or method to apply in estimating fair market
value. In applying this formula, these experts assumed
the obvious—that the best use of the property was for
subdivision and sale as residential lots. However, they
then approached the valuation as would a speculator.
They first computed the retail sale values of the lots.
Then they computed all conceivable possible future
expenses which a speculator purchasing the entire parcel
at a single sale might have to make, including his profit
and interest on his investment. The sum thus obtained
was then subtracted from the market value of the lots.
This, said the experts, is the amount which one or a
number of speculating snbdividers would be willing to
pay for the entire tract; thus this is the fair market value
of Parcel 1. (R. 377)

Experts testifying for respondents admitted that
this residual approach was appropriate from a subdivider's position where "raw acreage" was concerned
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(e. g. R. 226-8, 264), but stated that in their opinions
that approach was unreliable in appraising Parcel 1
because in fact it was not "raw acreage" (e.g. R. 229,
265). All witnesses agreed that except for Tract 1-C,
Parcel 1 was not raw acreage but had been substantially
improved; and that the lots contained therein were
available for immediate sale in their then condition on
July 12,1951. (e.g. R. 480) The parcel contained streets,
curbs, gutters and water, gas, power and telephone
lines. (R. 52) Some twenty of the lots had been sold
and all others were then available for immediate sale.
(e.g. R. 485) Because of the improved condition of
Parcel 1, experts for respondents accordingly applied
principally the "comparative" approach (e.g. R. 225,
291), whereby the fair market value of the property on
the specified date was determined by comparing the
land condemned with other similar land where known
sales of a similar nature had actually occurred at about
the time involved. They utilized the income or residual
approach only for purposes of checking the values
obtained in using the comparative approach, (e.g. R.
230)

On cross examination, experts testifying for the
State admitted the repute, integrity and qualification
of respondents' experts. (R. 391, 485) We thus simply
have a situation where qualified experts disagree. There
was an honest difference of opinion as to the appropriate
process to use in determining the fair market value of
Parcel 1 on July 12,1951. The jury, acting entirely within
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its province, reached its own valuation of the property
after considering the opinions of opposing experts.
(R. 93)

Parcels 2 and 3, the remaining land items for assessment, were also designated without objection by the
pre-trial order. (R. 52) The first tract abutted Oakhills Drive on the north side of Emigration Canyon, and
had been platted but neither surveyed nor recorded.
Parcel 3 was a somewhat similar tract abutting Kennedy
Drive on the Canyon's south side. In contrast with
Parcel 1 (the "finished product" or virtually completed
subdivision. (R. 229) Parcels 2 and 3 were primarily
paper subdivisions — acreage suitable for future residential use (R. 128 et seq.), and were so treated and
valued by all of the various experts, (e.g. R. 229, 255,
278)

Thus the specific objections raised by appellant to
the jury's verdict as to Parcel 1 are not present as to
either Parcel 2, valued by the jury at $91,500.00, or as
to Parcel 3, valued at $70,000.00. (R. 93)

The second major contention concerns the valuation
of the water-works owned by respondents, the fourth and
last item to be assessed. (R. 52, 81) At the first trial,
the court refused to admit expert testimony as to the
value of the water-works system. This court, in State
v. Peek, supra, held that such refusal by the trial court
5
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was error. At the re-trial, the court admitted the testimony of Mr. Ullrich over the objection of appellant, thus
conforming to the judgment of this court in State v.
Peek, supra. (R. 313-314)

Appellant now assigns the admission of this evidence
as prejudicial error. It admits that respondents were
properly compensated for the taking of the water right,
but contends that respondents should not be compensated
for the taking of the balance of their water-works system.
Thus appellant would pay respondents no more for the
property involved than if they owned only the land
and a water right, and some third party owned the
water-works system.

It is of course true as contended by appellant that
the experts for respondents in appraising the land in
Parcel 1 "considered" (along with all other such
factors) the incidental benefits of the presence of the
water system. However, such witnesses expressly stated
that the value of the waterworks system was not included
(e.g. R. 231). Respondents owned both the land amd the
fully developed water-works system. The presence of
the water system, regardless of its ownership, of course
increased the values of the land where the water could
be beneficially used. However, the fact that a single person owned both the water system and the land where it
could be put to use, should not cause it to forfeit to the
State the value of the water system.
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Mr. Ullrich, testifying for respondents, stated that
in his opinion, the value of the water collection, transmission, storage, and distribution system was $93,400.00
exclusive of the value of the water right. ( R 314)
Appellant objected to, but did not contradict this testimony. The competency and credibility of Mr. Ullrich is
not challenged. The jury by its verdict resolved the
issue by assigning a fair market value of $82,927.00 to
both the water-works and the water rights. (K. 93)
That this value was to be a part of the award of just
compensation to the Deere Estate had theretofore been
established by this court on the first appeal as the law
of this case; and the trial court so ruled. ( R 52)

Thus now before this court by way of the present
appeal is first an attempt to change its decision in State
v. Peek as to the water system; and then to persuade
this court that errors were made by the trial court below
in its rulings as to evidence and instructions which were
sufficiently pre judical to require that the jury's present
verdict as to the values of the last three parcels of the
Monument Park area should be set at naught.

Insofar as practical, respondents will meet the seventeen such errors alleged by appellant in the order presented by Appellant's Brief, under the seven points stated
hereafter.

7
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II.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1.
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the
determination of fair market values of the land condemned.

Point 2.
The court properly denied the motion of appellant to
strike the testimony of Witnesses Ralph B. Wright, H.
Mervin Wallace and Joseph E. Benedict as to valuation of
Parcel 1.

Point 3.
The court committed no error in admitting evidence,
refusing to strike evidence, or in instructing the jury concerning the valuation of the water system.

Point 4.
The court properly limited the evidence proffered by
expert witnesses Solomon and Ashton.

Point 5.
The court properly gave Instruction 15, and properly
refused to give Requested Instructions 14 and 15.
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Point 6.
The failure of the court to instruct as to burden of
proof, if error, was not prejudicial.

Point 7.
The court properly included and computed interest in
the judgment below.

III.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the
determination of fair market values of the land condemned.
a. The instructions of the court were consistent with
its pre-trial order.
The pre-trial order (to which no objection was made)
divided the property into eight separate parcels to facilitate orderly and systematic procedure. (R. 52-3) Instruction Number 11 following the pre-trial order states
as follows: (R. 81-2)
For the purpose of assessing the compensation to which defendant may be entitled, the whole
area of defendant's property has, by order of the
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court, been divided into eight parcels. Parcel 1 is
all that area colored yellow on the map, Exhibit 1,
which lies north of State Eoad No. 65; Parcel 2
is the area colored purple, abutting Oakhills
Drive; Parcel 3 is the area colored purple, abutting
on Kennedy Drive, and including the small semicircle colored purple farther up the canyon;
Parcel 4 is the area colored red; Parcel 5 is
the area colored brown; Parcel 6 is the area
colored yellow which lies at the southwest corner
of the map;
Parcel 7 is the area colored green; and Parcel
8 is the area colored blue.
Each area is shown on the map and designated by its parcel number.
All of the areas which are left in white on
Exhibit 1 belong to some owner other than the
Deere Estate, and the respective owners have
been paid just compensation for such areas. The
value of such areas is therefore not to be computed in the compensation due the Deere Estate.
The parties have agreed on the values of the
lands in Parcels numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and
these tracts are not involved in this action; therefore, no evidence as to their value has been given,
and you will not consider the value of such tracts.
Your consideration and duty will be confined to
determining the following matters:
(a) The fair market value of Parcel 1 on
July 12,1951.
(b) The fair market value of Parcel 2 on
July 12, 1951.
10
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(c) The fair market value of Parcel 3 on
July 12, 1951.
(d) The fair market value of the water
system and works installed by defendants
in the development of the subdivision
project.
You will determine separately the value of
each of the four items numbered (a), (b), (c),
(d), and from the evidence in the case, viewed
and construed in the light of the law as given in
these instructions, and return a verdict showing
the value you find as to each parcel or item,
and the total of all. We will furnish you a form
of verdict for your convenience.
b. The court at no time divided Parcel 1 into 62 parcels
for purposes of evaluation.
It is true that evidence of the value of such lots
without objection by the State was admitted, but solely
for the purpose of enabling the jury to understand the
manner in which the expert witnesses arrived at their
opinions as to fair market value of the whole of Parcel
1 as of July 12,1951. The court properly and adequately
instructed the jury how to determine itself the fair
market value of Parcel 1 as a unit by its Instructions
12 and 13 as follows: (R. 83-4)

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
It is elemental on determining fair value that
the owner is entitled to the value of the property
11
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for the highest and best use to which it could be
put at the time of taking.
Evidence in this case is undisputed that
Parcel 1 on July 12, 1951 consisted of sixty-two
lots, together with the small tract abutting State
Highway 65 designated 1-C. Twenty-two lots of
the eighty-four lots originally in the parcel had
been sold to other persons prior the condemnation
date, and the sixty-two remaining lots as of July
12, 1951 were suitable and available for use for
residential purposes, and each was held by the
defendants for sale as such. Tract 1-C likewise
under the undisputed evidence had as its highest
and best use, subdivision into lots and use for
residential purposes, and this tract was then
suitable and available for such use.
The owner is entitled to the fair market value
of all of the components of Parcel 1 as the property actually existed physically on July 12, 1951.
It is not proper to select a less advantageous or
less profitable use as the basis for determining
the owner's damages than the highest and best
use to which each of the components could actually
be put at the time of the taking in its then condition. Specifically, the defendants may not be
required to hold as mere acreage available and
suitable for sale as such to another or other subdividers, who in turn would sell it as lots to others,
the lots in Parcel 1 into which a portion of the
property had been divided.

INSTKIICTION NO. 13
As to that part of the lands in Parcel 1 on
which the subdivision work had progressed so far
that sales could be made by lots and houses built
12
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thereon for immediate use, the witnesses on values
were permitted to testify with reference to values
of separate lots. This was permitted to enable
you to understand the ways the witnesses, in
making their appraisals of value, work, in
arriving at their opinions as to the fair market of
the whole parcel; the matters they deemed as
affecting the market value of the property and
why and to what extent.
You may consider this evidence in determining the weight and value to be given to their
opinions as to value, j ^ n d ^ l s o ^ J I ^ J ^ ^ ^ a ^ i B
axrjviiigLja^jour verdict as to the fair market
value of ParceTlTon July 12, 1951.
You will not return a verdict as to the value
of each separate lot, but a verdict f<or the total
value of all the land embraced within Parcel
1, as your deliberations may determine.
Part of the land in Parcel 1 marked 1-C had
not been subdivided and was not saleable as lots
ready for use on July 12, 1951. These lands were
evaluated by the witnesses on an acreage basis
as a solid tract. You may determine the value
of such lands apart from the value of the platted
part, but the two must be added together to fix
the value of the entire parcel in your verdict.
(Italics ours.)

Appellant contends on pages 15 and 16 of its brief
that these Instructions 12 and 13 in effect directed the
jury that it " could and should value each lot in Parcel
1 individually based upon the testimony of appraisers
for respondents and that their verdict be a mathematical
13
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total of all of the 62 lots in Parcel 1." It is submitted
that such is obviously not the fact. Instruction 12
advised the jury of the highest and best use of Parcel
1 as agreed by appellant's own experts; that the owner
is entitled to the fair market value of all of the components of Parcel 1 as it existed on July 12, 1951; and
that the improved portion of Parcel 1 may not be
treated as raw unimproved acreage available for sale
only to another subdivider or other subdividers.

By Instruction 13 the court explained to the jury
why the evidence of value of each lot was admitted, and
directed that it might be considered with other evidence
in determining the fair market value of the entire parcel.
The only reference by the court to mathematical computation was the direction in the last sentence of Instruction 13 to add the values of the platted portion to the
unplatted portion of Parcel 1 in order to arrive at the
value for the entire parcel. An alternative within the
court's discretion would have been to have further
divided Parcel 1 into two or still more parcels for
separate assessments pursuant to statute (Judicial Code,
9 U.C.A. Sec. 78-34-10(1); State v. Peek, supra.)

c. Instructions Number 9 and 17, to which appellant
also objects, were proper.
On page 15 of its brief, appellant as to Instruction
9 states as follows:
14
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1

' By that instruction the trial court told the
jury that they should disregard all of the evidence
proffered by the State's appraisers and that they
should consider each of the sixty-two lots as a
single parcel.' y
Again, it is submitted that such is simply not so.
Instruction 9 wras as follows:
The fair market value of a parcel of property is based upon the value of that parcel apart
from and regardless of who may be the owner.
It does not change because of the color, creed,
financial status or residence of the owner, or the
fact that the owner owns other properties which
may or may not be affected by the condemnation
proceeding against the particular parcels which
are being taken. The fact that these defendants
ow~n a relatively large part of the entire area to
be condemned, does not subject them to any socalled wholesale discounts, or require you to
assume that all of their property must be purchased by a single purchaser at a single sale.
You are to determine the just compensation to
be paid on the basis of the fair market value of
the various parcels of the property taken, regardless who happened to own the property at the
time the condemnation action was brought.
(Italics ours.)

The sixty-two lots are not even mentioned in this
instruction. However, the court does instruct that each
of the parcels should be valued separately without giving
any weight to their ownership. The parcels referred}
to are obviously the/^eighti parcels specified by the pre
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trial order and which were set out in different colors on
Exhibit 1. That exhibit was on a blackboard before the
jury and was constantly referred to during the trial.
(R. 106) Even if one could become confused about what
the court meant by "parcels," any conceivable ambiguity
or uncertainty would be cured by Instruction Number
11, quoted supra, in which the court describes in detail
the eight parcels involved in this litigation and shown by
Exhibit 1.

Instruction 17 is also objected to by appellant. This
states as follows: (R. 88)
In determining the fair market value of the
property taken and any part or parcel thereof,
you are not to take into consideration any speculative increase or decrease in values that may
occur, or have occurred in the future; nor any
consideration of future tax or sale commission
that might be paid for future sales; nor any future
special improvements that might be installed;
norHtEe fact that it is the State which takes the
land, nor the use they may make of it; nor any
possible future cost to the State, nor possible
future expenses that defendants be saved by selling now; nor any interest the defendants might
be saved or be entitled to receive; nor any
expenses incident to this litigation. Any question
of interest must be determined and fixed by the
court.
You are confined to the fair market value as
of July 12, 1951.
16
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The authorities to the effect that in eminent domain
proceedings the trier of fact is confined to existing
conditions and values at the time of condemnation, and
may not consider speculative future occurrences, are too
numerous to need citation. It is 'submitted- that Instruction 17 was entirely proper.
d. Appellant's Requested Instructions 10, 11 and 12
were given in substance.
Appellant alleges error in refusing to give a portion
of Requested Instruction 10, and on page 16 of its
brief "most strenuously urge" that the request was not
covered in substance by other instructions. This portion
instructed that the value of each parcel was "to be
measured by the fair market value of such parcel as
an entirety as of July 12, 1951."
As was noted by the court (R. 65), this instruction
was given in substance in other instructions, namely, in
Instructions 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13,14, 17 and 20. (R. 75-91)
Appellant's Requested Instruction 11, quoted on
page 16 of its brief, was also given in substance in other
instructions as noted by the court. (R. 66) The substance
of this requested charge is very aptly set forth in Instructions 7 and 8 (R. 77-8) quoted in part as follows, to-wit:
17
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7
The owner of the land which is taken under
proceedings in eminent domain for public use, is
entitled to receive as just compensation for such
taking the reasonable and fair market value of
such land for the highest and best use of which
the land is capable at the time of such taking. In
this connection, you may consider use of appropriate tracts for subdivision, for commercial, for
residential or for any other lawful purpose or use
to which you believe the property could be or was
best adapted.
By fair market value is meant the price which
property will bring when it is offered for sale by
one who is willing but is not obliged to sell. In
other words, the fair market value means the fair
value between one who is willing to purchase and
one who is willing to sell, when neither is acting
under compulsion or necessity. The question is:
If the defendants were willing to sell their property, what could be obtained for it on the market
from parties who were willing to buy and would
give its full value for the most advantageous use
to which the property is or could be adapted?
The compensation to which the defendants in
this case are entitled is to be determined with
reference to the uses for which each of the various
tracts of the property was suitable in its then
condition on July 12, 1951, having regard to its
location, situation and quality, and to the wants
in that locality, or such as might reasonably be
expected in the near future. The compensation
being the value of the property for the highest
and best use to which it could reasonably be put.
18
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INSTBUCTION NO. 8
4

'Just compensation", as used in these instructions, is such a sum of money as will make
the property owner whole, so that, upon receipt
of the same, he will be no poorer and no richer
by reason of the taking of his property than he
would be if the same were not taken. The term
"just compensation77 means "just77 not only to
the party whose property is taken for public use,
but also "just77 to the party which is to pay for
it, (Italics ours.)

It is submitted that Appellant's Eequested Instruction 12, quoted on page 17 of its brief, was not a proper
instruction because of the phrase "but your value must
be the value of the whole of Parcel 1, the plotted and unplotted portions taken together as one unit," To give
this instruction would be like telling the jury to value a
horse and a cow, as a whole, together as a unit. The
principal part of the parcel was fully improved with
roads, utilities, etc. and contained lots available for immediate sale to the public. Each of the six appraisers
based his estimate of fair market value upon the value
of the individual lots in this section of Parcel 1. As
heretofore set forth, the difference in valuation between
opposing witnesses resulted from the deduction by the
State's experts of speculative selling costs from their
" g r o s s " market value in determining what they thought
was 4' fair'' market value.
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However, all of the witnesses in this case valued the
remainder of Parcel 1, which was still raw acreage, on
an acreage basis. Thus the two areas within Parcel 1
were fundamentally different and of necessity were
valued independently by all witnesses. Therefore, in
Instruction 13 (E. 84) the court directed:
Part of the lands in Parcel 1 marked 1-C had not
been subdivided and was not saleable as lots
ready for use on July 12, 1951. These lands were
evaluated by the witnesses on an acreage basis
as a solid tract. You may determine the value of
such lands apart from the value of the platted
part, but the two must be added together to fix
the value of the entire parcel in your verdict.

With this exception, the substance of the requested
instruction was given by the court in Instruction 13,
quoted in full supra.

e. The court did not err in giving Instruction 10 and
rejecting Request No. 5.

On page 18 of its brief appellant urges that the giving of Instruction 10 (B. 80) and the failure to give its
Eequested Instruction 5 (E. 60) was prejudicial error.
The reason given is that Instruction 10 does not properly
define a willing seller and a willing buyer. The inference
then is that the requested instruction does so properly
define. The questioned instructions are as follows:
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10
In ascertaining the fair market value of the
defendants' property, it is not proper to assume
either a single sale or a simultaneous sale. On the
contrary, you must assume that the owner as a
willing seller has a reasonable time under all the
circumstances within which to dispose of his property. Also as a willing seller, he has the right and
it must be assumed that he may exercise that
right, to dispose of the property in such a manner
as would result in obtaining its fair market value
for the highest and best use to which the property
or any of its parts can be adapted.
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5
The fact, if it is a fact, that an owner is unwilling to sell, or objects to the condemnation,
does not affect the market value. The measure of
compensation in the case of an owner who objects
to the taking of his property for a public use is
in no respects different from the measure in the
case of an owner who is willing that his property
be taken for such use.
It is submitted that neither of these instructions
properly defines a willing buyer and a willing seller;
that they were not intended to so define; that Instruction 7 (R. 77) quoted supra, to which appellant did not
abject, does properly define a willing buyer and a willing
seller; that the substance of Requested Instruction 5 is
contained in Instruction 7; and that Instruction 10 was
entirely proper as a cautionary supplement to Instruction 7 and the other instructions given in the extensive
charge of the court to the jury. (R. 74-92.)
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On pages 38 and 39 of appellant's brief, reference
is made to the alleged error in giving Instruction 10 and
refusing Requested Instruction 5. As an additional
ground for error, appellant alleges " t h e r e is no time
limitation placed upon i t . " We submit that this is not
error, for in Instructions 5, 7, 11,12, 13, 14,15,17,18 and
20 the date of evaluation was expressly set forth. The
omission could not possibly have misled the j u r y and was
cured by the frequent admonition for the jury to value
the property as of July 12 1951.

Summing up appellant's objections to the court's instructions, we submit that a reading of Judge Larson's
careful and extensive charge (R, 74-92), having the relatively simple issues in mind, will satisfy this reviewing
tribunal that the j u r y was fully and correctly advised as
to the law and as to its function and duties. Appellant's
objections are neither well-taken nor could prejudicial
error result from that to which complaint is made on
appeal.

(Appellant's Point 1 ( F ) , relating to its motion to
strike certain evidence, will next be covered separately.)

Point 2.
The court properly denied the motion of appellant to
strike the testimony of Witnesses Ralph B. Wright, H.
Mervin Wallace and Joseph E. Benedict as to valuation of
Parcel 1.
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Appellant does not question the following propositions:
(1)

Fair market value is a question of fact for the
jury.

(2)

The jury may consider the opinions of qualified experts as to fair market value.

(3)

All of Parcel 1 except that part marked 1-C on
Exhibit 1 was fully improved and available for
immediate sale to the public as residential lots
at the time of condemnation.

(4)

The highest and best use of Parcel 1 was the
sale of the subdivided lots for residential
purposes.

(5)

Witnesses Wright, Wallace and Benedict were
qualified experts.

(6)

Their concept of fair market value was
proper, and was the same as those of witnesses testifying for appellant.

(7)

Both the '' income," i' residual,'' and the i i comparative" approaches are commonly used by
appraisers to determine fair market values.
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The only and particular complaint of appellant (and
its argument of Point I-F in pages 19 through 38 of its
brief) is that witnesses Wright, Wallace and Benedict
for the owners utilized a wrong approach in reaching an
opinion as to the fair market value of Parcel 1. The
State contends in substance that the comparative approach is not an appropriate method when applied to
Parcel 1, but that the income or residual approach is the
only proper approach.
This contention is itself an opinion. A search of the
record does not disclose any statement by appellant's
own experts that the comparative approach is not a
proper one to apply in appraising Parcel 1. They simply
state that in their opinions the residual approach was
here more appropriate. Respondent's experts, however,
expressed opinions that while the residual approach
might be appropriate in appraising raw acreage from
the subdivider's point of view, it is not a satisfactory
method of appraising a fully developed subdivision
available for immediate sale to the public, (e. g. B. 229)
It is submitted that neither counsel nor the court is
the proper person to select the only appropriate method
of appraising Parcel 1. Reputable and qualified experts
could not agree. Their testimony was conflicting. In
such instance, the jury is the proper moderator. 29
C. J. S. 1297, Sec. 289. The court properly admitted the
testimony of all of the experts and instructed the jury
as to the correct way to consider and weigh such testimony by Instructions 20 and 21. (R. 91-2.)
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Appellant cites no cases which hold that evidence of
the retail value of lots in a completed subdivision is not
proper. As has been repeatedly stated, Parcel 1, with the
exception of section or tract 1-C, was fully subdivided
into residential lots, fully improved, and held and ready
for immediate sale to the public. The Deere Estate had
been developing this area for a period of many, many
years as a residential subdivision. The long-range planning, engineering, and development had been substantially completed prior the time of condemnation. An extensive water system had been developed and installed.
Power, telephone and gas lines had been laid underground, a selling program had been adopted. The lots
were fully divided. The roads were completed with the
exception of a final hot plant mix which winter weather
had delayed. Mr. Solomon on cross examination (E. 480)
admitted that every lot in the subdivision was available
for immediate sale as residential lots on July 12, 1951.
The only other work which in his opinion was necessary
was the marking of the lot corners with stakes. However, he admitted that some of the lots had already been
sold without such marking. (E. 494) No conflict existed
as to these physical facts.

Under these circumstances, respondents submit that
it was entirely proper for the court to admit opinion
evidence as to the retail value of each lot in Parcel 1.
Such values were taken into consideration by all of the
experts in arriving at their opinions as to the fair market value of the whole parcel, and no objection was made
by the State when such evidence was offered.
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Three cases, as follows, each cited and quoted from
by appellant, alone completely justify the action of the
court in refusing to strike the expert testimony so admitted :

(1) The California case of Redwood City Elementary School District v. Gregotre, 276 P. 2d 78, cited by
appellant on page 38 of its brief, most definitely justifies
the consideration of the lot values in Parcel 1 by the jury.
That case is particularly strong for respondents' position. There the property consisted of 12.23 acres of land
containing acacia and eucalyptus trees, a six-bedroom
home, a barbecue with kitchen and dance hall, workmen's
quarters, garage, hay barn, chicken coops, sheep barns
and acreage of farm land devoted to raising flowers.
However, the expert appraisers all agreed that the highest and best use of the property would be for subdivision
purposes, and that it could be divided into 60 separate
lots. As noted, no subdivision had as then been initiated.
Quoting from appellant's brief, page 38:

"The two appraisers for the school district
gave figures of $78,750.00 and $78,400.00, while
the two appraisers for the owner gave $153,000.00
and $146,750.00; cmd this last figure was demonstrated as a mathemathieal total of the value of
each of the sixty lots, A jury returned a verdict
of $83,500.00 and the owner appealed. The appellate court affirmed hold (holding?) that it was
proper to submit both sets of values to the jury
***." (Italics ours.)
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The property in this Gregoire case was not subdivided. It was raw acreage. Yet, the experts were permitted to justify their opinions as to fair market value
by showing the mathematical computations of the sums
of the retail sale price of each lot. Lots in this case were
conjectural only. None existed in fact. Not only would
extensive development be necessary to make the lots
ready for sale, but the existing buildings would have to
be razed.

(2) State v. Deal, 233 P. 2d 242, cited by appellant
at page 35 of its brief, though also dealing with raw
acreage, is cited by respondents for dictum justifying
the consideration by the jury in this case of the value of
actual individual lots in Parcel 1. There the property
was hilly ocean-side porperty. It was completely unimproved. No subdivision had been made. The land was
raw acreage. Since the land was completely unimproved,
the court stated:
''probable value of lots that do not exist is too
speculative,''
However, the court aded by way of dictum that:
"Evidence which is speculative in one situation
may not be so m others. Thus, in County of Blue
Earth v. St. Paul & Sioux City R Co., 28 Minn.
503, 11 N. W. 73, the court, per Mitchell, J., held
it proper for witnesses on value to adopt as a
basis for their calculations the process of dividing
the land into lots for residential purposes and
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then calculating the market value of the property
by lots. But the land in that case was city property, in fact the court house square, while here
we are dealing with a wild land on the Ocean
Coast/' (Italics ours.)

It is interesting to note that in the Minnesota case
where evidence was allowed (involving the court house
square) no subdivision had been attempted and razing
would also be necessary.

(3) Catlin v. Northern Coal and Iron Co., 225 Pa.
262, 74 Atl. 56, cited by appellant's brief, page 24, in support of its contention that it was reversible error to deny
its motion to strike the testimony of respondent's experts, is also cited by respondents for the opposite proposition. There, a tract had been marked out on the
ground into lots and streets. No improvements had been
made. The owner advertised them for sale, but no sale
was consummated because his offer was $500 per lot
above the highest bid. A large number of witnesses testified as to the value of the property if sold as individual
building lots. Appellant contended that it was reversible
error for the trial court to refuse to strike such evidence.
This issue was not reached on its merits because appellant's objections were not properly presented. However,
the trial court also refused to instruct the jury to disregard such evidence as speculative and remote, but
charged that such would be the case only if the estimates
of lot value were based upon future sales. This instruc-
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tion allowed the jury to consider testimony as to market
value of the lots at the time of condemnation. The court
held that the charge was proper. In justifying its decision, the court distinguished the case from one where
unimproved raw acreage was concerned as follows, to

What was said in these cases, if not considered in connection with their facts, might appear
to give support to the view now earnestly pressed
upon us. These cases, however, must be read and
understood in view of the situation at the time of
the entry. The entry in these cases was made on
farm land in rural districts, and they were not
immediately available for sale as building lots.
The effort was made to add a fictitious value to
the lands entered upon by undertaking to show
that they could be divided into lots, and might be
sold for building purposes. It was apparent, however, that this was all speculative, and had no
real basis in fact. The lands appropriated were
farm lands, and in determining their value it was
necessary to limit the inquiry to those intrinsic
elements of value existing at the time of the appropriation. In the case last cited a witness was
asked on preliminary cross-examination if his estimate was based upon what it would bring if it
had been laid out in building lots, and all the lots
had been sold at what he considered them worth,
to which an affirmative answer was given. This
court held that the method of estimating market
value indicated by the answer of the witness was
improper. This case is clearly right on the facts.
The tract of land had not been laid out m lots. It
was farm land. There was no immediate pros29
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pect of its being available for sale as building lots,
and hence such a method of estimating value
would be purely speculative. (Italics ours.)

It is interesting to note that practically all of the
authorities cited by the appellant refer specifically to unimproved land where no subdivision has commenced.
Each of them is therefore necessarily distinguished from
the case at bar by the reasoning of Judge Elkin in Catlin
v. Northern Coal & Iron Co., supra, cited by appellant.
The following cited by appellant fall into this category:
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, p. 107 (Page 22).
18 Am. Jur. on Eminent Domain, Sec. 244, at p. 881
(page 23).
United States v. 3,544 Acres of Land, 147 F. 2d 596,
(Pages 25-26).
City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 262 Pac. 737, (page
32).
Redwood City Elementary School Dist. v. Gregoire,
276 P. 2d 78, (page 38).
City of Napa v. Navoni, 132 P. 2d 566, (page 34).
Thornton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545,
(page 34).
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It is further submitted that no other authority cited
by appellant supports its contention that it was error to
deny appellant's motion to strike the testimony of
Wright, Wallace and Benedict as to the fair market
value.
Finally, it should be made clear to this court that the
experts' appraisals were not just made by simply adding
ux3 the totals of the possible values of sixty-two lots and
Tract 1-C, using this mathematical result as the fair market value of Parcel 1. The opinions expressed were in
each case judgment figures for the entire parcel. In arriving at such opinions, each expert had of course taken
into consideration a vast store of pertinent information
reflecting or having an effect on values. This included,
as expressly authorized by this court's opinion in State
v. Peek, supra, lot values of the twenty-two comparable
lots in this very area which had been sold on the open
market shortly before the Legislature authorized this
condemnation.
For example, as to the witness Ralph B. Wright:
(R. 229-230)
"Q. Now, as I understand it, your assessment or
appraisal of fair market value of the entire parcel is
not the mathematical total of your individual appraisals of all of the various parts, as I understand
it?
A. Yes sir, that's correct.
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Q. That is, it isn't the total, or it is the total?
A. Well, let me be specific. The total for all the
figures—that is, for the three elements of Parcel
1—is $314,250.00.

Q. That is the mathematical total?
A. That is the mathematical total of all the lots,
plus the $14,000.00 which I ascribed to the area 1-C
down in the corner. I rounded that off at $310,000.00

Q. And, in doing that, you also took into consideration the various other methods which appraisers
have available to them as tools ?
A. Yes sir.

Q. And the figure of $310,000.00 for the entire period is your judgment figure based upon your experience ?
A. That's correct."
The trial court properly denied plaintiff's Motion
to Strike.

32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Point 3.
The court committed no error in admitting evidence,
refusing to strike evidence, or in instructing the jury concerning the valuation of the water system.

a. Appellant does not challenge Mr. Ullrich's qualifications as an expert, nor does it contradict his testimony. Its major contention with respect to the valuation
of the water system is that "the evidence clearly shows
that its value is included within the values placed by the
appraisers upon the land iteself and that to permit the
jury to place a separate value upon it requires the State
of Utah to pay for it twice, (p. 41) (Italics ours.) In
support of this contention appellant states "we feel compelled" to quote cross-examination; whereupon a portion of the record is quoted at page 41 and 42 of the
brief.

Had appellant's feelings of compulsion caused it to
continue to quote the record from page 231, it would have
become abundantly clear that Mr. Wright did not include
the value of the water system in his valuation of the
land. The court's attention is invited to the record, page
231, where appellant's quotation stops:
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BY MR BEHLE:
Q. Well, on this point now, of course, you took into
your values the fact that water was ready and available, did you not?
A. Yes sir.

Q, And, if there hadn't been water, the values
would have been lower just as they are lower because there is no sewer, is that correct?
A. Yes sir.

Q. But, as to the value of the water system that
made that water available, were those independent
values or are those reflected in the lot values?
A. Well, the value of the water system itself is another matter. The presence of the water system in
the streets is reflected in my values for the lots, but
that does not imply that the owner of the land owns
the pipe or the water system itself.

Q. In other words, the lot values with water would
have been the same whether water came from Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, the Deere Estate, or
apart from the ownership of the source ?
A. Yes sir, that's correct.
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Q. And did you, or did you not, include in your
figures the value of the water system itself?
A. No, I did not.

As is admitted by appellant on page 42 of its brief,
witnesses Wallace and Benedict made similar statements,
(e. g. R. 261)

In appraising this land, the experts considered all
the favorable factors operating which would give the
land desirability as residential property. The availability of such facilities as power, gas, telephone, and water
lines, roads, curbs, gutters, etc. naturally incidentally increased the market value of the property. If there had
been no water available on the property, the value would
of course have been less. If the telephone lines were not
installed, that also would be reflected in a decreased
valuation of the land in question. However, that incidental effect upon the fair market value has no relation
to the actual value of the facility itself.

The near proximity of the Indian Hills and Monument Park residential subdivisions also increased the
value of the land in question. Could appellant be heard
to argue that since presence of the Indian Hills subdivision was reflected in the fair market value of the
Deere Estate, that the owners of Indian Hills need not be
35
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

compensated should it be condemned? It could not. It
is submitted that appellant's contention with respect to
this extensive water system is equally ridiculous.

The Deere Estate developed and owned a complex
water collection, storage, transmission and distribution
system which took a great deal of time and money to develop. (E. 115, 197) This property was seized by the
State of Utah in this condemnation proceeding. Yet,
appellant contends that the Estate should not be compensated for this valuable property beyond the incidental
increased value which its presence contributed to the
property which it served.

Note that on page 45 of its brief, appellant contends
the system had no market value except with the property
condemned. There is no evidence in the record to support such a contention. Mr. Ullrich testified without contradiction on cross examination as follows: (B. 324-5)
1

.

'

•

•

•

Q. Mr. Ullrich, on what other areas in this vicinity could this water be beneficially used?
i

A. The water in question could be used to supply
domestic and culinary water to homes in Emigration Canyon over a distance extending from the
mouth of the canyon to two miles up said canyon.
Said water could also be used as a culinary and
domestic supply to any building sub-division developed in the foothill area immediately south of
36
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Emigration Canyon and above the area now
served by Salt Lake City municipal water system.
Similarly, said water could be used on any building subdivision in the foothills north of the present State Park area. Said water could also be
used as an auxiliary supply to Fort Douglas.

This identical question was decided by this court in
State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630. In commenting
upon the refusal of the trial court to admit opinion evidence as to the value of the water system (the very same
evidence that appellant now claims should not have been
admitted in the second trial) this court said in part:
The court also erred in excluding appellant's
opinion evidence on the value of their waterworks
system. Appellant's witness showed himself qualified to give an expert opinion on that question.
He also testified that this system was capable of
being used in connection with property outside of
appellant's lands. * * * It undoubtedly would have
aided the jury in determining the true value of
appellant's property had all of these details been
shown to them, for certainly they could more accurately assess the valuation of this property if
they had before them the value which the experts
placed on this system in arriving at their over-all
value of the property, and could test such valuation by comparison with the opinion of an expert
on the value of that kind of property. The value
of such a utility is especially one which calls for
expert opinion because such property is not
bought and sold every day on the open market, so
expert opinion thereon is almost mandatory.
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Appellant does not contend nor does the record show
that the testimony of the expert in the second trial is
different in any way from that proffered at the first. It
simply contends that the court "improperly permitted
the witness, Ullrich, to testify as to values of the water
distribution and transmission system." A complete answer is that the decision of this court stating that the
value of the waterworks system was competent evidence
is the law of the case. The evidence was properly admitted.

b. It is further contended by appellant that this
court did not intend that the water system be valued separately from the property condemned. The court's attention is respectfully directed to the statement in State
v. Peek, supra, at page 275, that "Respondent's own witnesses treated this (the water-works system) as a
valuable property right of appellants," Whether or not
this court anticipated that this particular property right
should be determined separately, or jointly with other
property is not here important. It was a valuable property right for which just compensation must be paid.
Appellant does not challenge the pre-trial exercise of
the trial court's discretion in permitting the jury to
evaluate this particular property right as a unit; nor
Instruction Number 11 (B. 81), quoted supra, in which
the court instructs the jury to make separate findings as
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to the values of the four separate property interests, one
of which was the water system. It simply challenges the
propriety of allowing the jury to consider evidence giving any value whatsoever to this property right.

c. By the same token, appellant's Requested Instruction 19, quoted at page 40 of its brief, was properly
refused. This instruction would in effect strike the evidence as to value of the water system which this court
held to be proper in State v. Peek, supra.

d. The trial court properly admitted the testimony
of Mr. Brayton and Exhibit No. 39 as evidence of the
value of the water system. It should be noted that Mr.
Brayton gave no opinion as to value of the system. He
simply testified from his own knowledge as to the cost of
the system. (R. 317) In support of its contention appellant cites cases saying that the cost of improvements is
not admissible as evidence of the fair market value of the
land improved.

First, this is a minority view. The prevailing rule
is stated in 29 C. J. S. 1267 as follows, to wit:
Where the land is improved, and the improvements have an intrinsic value which must be
added to the land in order to ascertain the market
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value of the whole, evidence of the separate value
of improvements is admissible. Livesch v. Board
of Education of St, Bernard, 13 Ohio App. 161;
Hall v. City of Providence, 121 A. 66, 45 E. 1.167;
State v. Carpenter, 89 S. W. 2d 979,126 Tex. 604.

Second, this line of cases has no application to the
case at bar. As is shown by Instruction 11, quoted supra,
that part of respondents' property comprised of the
waterworks system was evaluated separately by the jury.
This was done by exercise of the trial court's discretion
(State v. Peek) to facilitate orderly and systematic procedure. Appellant took no objection to Instruction 11
directing the jury to evaluate Parcel 1, Parcel 2, Parcel
3 and the Water System separately, nor to the pre-trial
order; and no abuse of direction is shown.

In computing the value of the water system, its
recent actual cost was material and was properly admitted as evidence of its fair market value. The rule is
properly stated in 29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, at page
1267, as follows, to wit:
Price paid for property: While there is authority apparently to the contrary, evidence as to
. the price paid for the property sought to be taken
is generally held admissible as some evidence of
its market value, except where the purchase was
so remote in point of time from the condemnation
proceeding as to afford no fair criterion of present value * * *.
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The rule is stated similarly in H. & H. Supply Co.
v. U. S., C. A. Okl., 194 P. 2d 554, Thornton v. City of
Birmingham, 35 So. 2d 545, 250 Ala. 651, 7 A. L. R. 2d
773, and Regents of University of Minn. v. Irwin, 57 N.
W. 2d 625.

The rule is stated in 18 Am. Jur. 994, Sec. 351, as
follows, to wit:
When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, it is competent, as evidence of its
market value, to show the price at which it was
bought, if the sale was a voluntary one, and not so
remote in time as to have no bearing upon the
question of present value.

In Requested Instruction 19 (Brief p. 40) appellant
admits that the only evidence in the record as to value of
the water system was that supplied by witnesses Ullrich
and Brayton. It does not complain that these witnesses
assigned an erroneous value to the system. Its only contention is that respondents should not be compensated
for the water-works system at all.

This theory is not only grossly inequitable—it is in
direct contradiction of the opinion of this court and the
law of this case declared in State v. Peek, supra. It controverts established constitutional principles necessitat41
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ing the payment of just compensation for property seized
by the State. The questioned evidence was properly admitted.

Point 4.
The court properly limited the evidence proffered by
expert witnesses Solomon and Ashton.
Appellant's concern on appeal, and failure to understand the basis of the court's rulings below as to this
point, may be due to lack of recognition both of the scope
of direct and cross examination of expert witnesses and
the trial court's powers with respect thereto.

By pre-trial order or in the course of trial, the court
in the exercise of sound discretion can limit even the
right to call an expert witness at all, by curtailing the
number to prevent endless trials. (U. R. C. P. 16 (4).)
Its control over the expert testimony adduced is plenary,
subject of course to review if arbitrary or capricious and
prejudicial in result. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule
56 et seq.

Usually, the expert qualifies as such; and then on
direct is asked if he has formed an opinion on the fact
at issue; and if so, what that opinion is. In this case, the
only facts at issue were the fair market values of the parcels and property condemned. Each expert, having qual-
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ified as such and having shown to the satisfaction of the
court his competency to express an opinion of value, was
permitted to testify to such on direct examination.

On cross examination it is of course then appropriate, under general law as well as State v. Peek, supra,
to test credibility, methods, etc.

In the trial below appellant's first witness as to the
land values—Kiepe, as noted on page 45 of the State's
Brief, was permitted on direct examination to give a
very thorough and comprehensive review of the basis of
his expert appraisal, detailing the many steps he took in
forming an opinion as to the fair market value of the
property condemned. He of course had formed as a result an opinion of the fair market value of the three parcels, and on direct examination was further permitted to
express such opinions, which were the only issues of fact
involved.

Also without objection by defendants, Kiepe on direct examination was further permitted to give his estimates and opinions as to the possible expenses which
might in the future be incurred by some assumed
speculating subdivider who might care to purchase the
whole of the Deere Estate property, including hypothetical surveying, planning, road building, construction of
sidewalks, curbs and gutters, installation of utilities,
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taxes, revenue stamps, abstracting, marketing costs, interest on investment, and the profit which the imaginary
speculator might reasonably anticipate. He was also
permitted without objection on direct examination to put
an estimated dollar value on each of these speculated
expenditures. All this resulted in further lengthy and
extensive cross examination which delved in detail into
these "guesstimates." (R. 332-417.)

Following this, the next expert witnesses for the
State, Solomon and Ashton, were also permitted on direct examination to show in equal detail their processes
in arriving at the opinions which they then expressed of
the fair market values with which the case was concerned. (R. 418 et seq.) However, their direct testimony
was restricted by the court upon defendant's objections,
only in that they were not permitted to assign hypothetical
dollar values as to each speculative possible future expenditure. The issue may be clarified by quotations from
the record at pages 428, 434, et seq.:

/

THE COURT: The witness may testify to the
methods he used in arriving at his judgment as
to the value—the things he took into consideration. I think he should not testify with respect to
the values he put on individual elements he used
in arriving at his conclusion.
MR. HORSLEY: But I can inquire as to which
elements make up which group without going into
the numbers in each case, is that true?
4A
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THE COURT: Yes.
# # *

THE COURT: Here is the problem, Mr. Porter,
as the Court sees it; what we are after here is the
fair market value of this property on the twelfth
of July, '51, as the property was.
MR. PORTER: That's right.
THE COURT: Now, what you are seeking to do
is to establish value, not of what the property was
at that time, but of a price—may I say—that a
a speculator might hope to realize out of it at
some future time.
MR. PORTER: No, we are not Your Honor.
THE COURT: And, then deduct from that certain expenses, which, if he did that, he might have
to meet and say, "Now, the result is the fair market value."
MR. PORTER: I think it goes a lot further than
that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, the market value of that
property isn't what it would be if it had sewer
and paved roads, and all the utilities in there, and
then take a value, then go and take those things
out and say, "Now, it cost that much to do that."
# # *

MR. PORTER: Now, for the record, we make the
same proffer of evidence to be asked the witness
Ashton as to Parcels 2 and 3, as was made with
45
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respect to Parcel 1 to include the same items, or
approximately the same items, and we make the
same proffer with respect to the witness Solomon,
to be called as to all three parcels. The evidence
in both cases to be pretty much the same,
MR. BEHLE: Well, that is the figures.
ME. PORTER: That's right.
MR. BEHLE: Our objection is to the use of the
figures; not to the process.

The language from State v. Peek quoted on page 46
of appellant's brief is entirely consistent with the action
of the trial court. The court specifically permitted on
direct examination, evidence of the value of the "various
elements, Hems and parts" of respondents' property. It
also permitted testimony as to the methods used in arriving at fair market value of "various elements, items
and p a r t s " of the property. All of appellant's evidence
as to fair market value of the property in question on
July 12, 1951 was admitted. None was excluded. The
experts were permitted fully to explain their methods in
reaching their expressed opinions as to the fair market
values.

The court, on objection by defendants and acting
within its discretion, properly limited on direct examination only detailed opinion evidence as to the hypothetical
particular amounts of possible future expenditures which
46
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

some imaginary speculating subdivider might make in
disposing of the property some day if he ever might
acquire it.

Point 5.
The court properly gave Instruction 15, and properly
refused to give Requested Instructions 14 and 15.
These instructions (R. 69, 70 and 86) pertained to
the streets within and abutting the property of the defendants herein condemned by the State of Utah. It is to be
noted that the appellant excepted only to that portion
of Instruction 15 dealing with Kennedy Drive (R. 519),
which as given by the court reads as follows: (R. 86)

INSTRUCTION 15
The evidence in this case is undisputed that
the defendants' property denominated Parcel 3
and colored on Exhibit 1 in purple, while planned
and suitable for residential subdivision purposes,
nevertheless as of July 12, 1951 had not yet been
so divided into separate lots which were then
ready, available and intended for sale and use as
such.
Accordingly, in making your determination
as to the fair market value of Parcel 3, you will
assess separately first the tract abutting on and
north of Kennedy Drive; secondly, the tract
abutting on and south of Kennedy Drive, includ-
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ing the defendants' interests in the other half of
Kennedy Drive as abutting owners subject to the
public easement, and also including defendants'
interests to the center of Michigan Avenue, since
vacated as a public highway; and finally, the
small area in the draw up Emigration Canyon. All
these are colored purple on Exhibit 1.
>
Each of the three tracts will be separately
valued by you, and the total of the three will constitute your assessment of the fair market value
of the parcel 3.

It is submitted that the foregoing instruction, including the portion to which exception was made, properly
states the law. The court instructed the jury to include
the property rights of the defendants as abutting owners
of land adjacent to Kennedy Drive, subject to the public
easement. The court did not instruct that defendants
were the owners of the fee title. It just instructed the
jury to value "defendants' interests to the center of Kennedy Drive." These interests would be the same,
whether the public interest in the Drive was still
"owned" by Salt Lake County or was to be condemned
and acquired from Salt Lake County by the State of
Utah as first directed by the legislature until the amendment discussed in the case of State v. Bird & Evans, 265
P. 2d 639, 1 U. 2d 276.
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Only the two cases cited by appellant at page 47 of
its brief need be cited to show that an abutting owner
does have a property interest in platted streets. Boskovich v. Midvale City, 243 P. 2d 435, ( U ) does not
hold that a platted street vests title in the city or the
county, and that the abutting owners thereafter have "no
further interest therein/' as contended by appellant.
Just the reverse is true. This case clearly shows that an
abutting owner has two valuable rights in a platted public road:

(1)

An easement to the roadway which may not
be taken by the governing authority without
the payment of just compensation.

(2) A right to tbe possession and ownership to the
center of the roadway when and if the governing authority vacates the public street.

These were valuable property rights appurtenant to
the defendants' abutting land. The court properly instructed that the value of such rights should be considered when valuing the abutting property.

White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P. 2d 210,
U.
,
also recognizes a valuable property right to the center
of a public road, appurtenant to abutting land. This
court stated the law to be as follows :
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The segregated statutory provisions are reconcilable when construed to mean that the county
or city authorities are vested with the fee in the
streets. Such ownership carries with it the right
to use it f\or the enumerated purposes when, in
their discretion, it best serves the public interest.
If the street should cease to serve any public interest, it may be abandoned and, in that case, the
right to the use and control of the roadway would
revert to the abutting owner pursuant to 36-1-7
and the common law principles. (Italics ours.)

Consequently, the court also properly refused to
give Requested Instructions 14 and 15. They do not correctly state the law. They give no value to the two property rights of the abutting landowner above set forth.
Under these suggestions of the State, rejected by the
court, property interests would be taken from defendants
without payment of just compensation.

Point 6.
The failure of the court to instruct as to burden of
proof, if error, was not prejudicial

Throughout the conduct of the trial, all recognized
the owners' duty to go forward with the burden of presenting evidence to the jury as fact-finder upon which
to enable it to determine the issue of fair market value.
(Augmented record dated June 15, 1955.)
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In the proposed instructions submitted by both
parties a specific instruction on burden of proof was included since at no time was such in dispute. (R. 57)
Normally this would immediately precede the old " preponderance of evidence'9 definition, which is contained in
the stock printed instructions of the District Court which
were given in this case. (R. 92) Appellant's requested
Instruction No. 2 included also this "preponderance of
the evidence" definition, and also other portions which
were at least controversial, causing the court to reject
same in the form requested.

The omission of the stock "burden of proof" was
not noted at the time the instructions were given by
counsel or the court, and certainly were not in the mind
of counsel for the State when objection was made to the
rejection of Request No. 2 in the following language:
"We except to the failure of the court to give
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 2, for the
reason that said instruction does not correctly
state the law, and failure to give it was prejudicial to the plaintiff; the said requested instruction speaks for itself in that respect. (R. 517-18.)
(Italics ours.)

Was the omission of a specific instruction as to
burden of proof, and the refusal to which the above exception was made, prejudicial to the fair trial of the issues of value in this case ?
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It is agreed that in the decision of Tanner v. Provo
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 U. 105, 121 Pac. 584,
this court aligned itself with those jurisdictions placing
the burden on the owner to prove the value of the property condemned. However, burden of proof is not as
critical in eminent domain proceedings as in other areas
of the law. Some jurisdictions have wisely ceased to give
even lip service to "Burden of Proof" in condemnation
cases.

In City of Cincinnati v. Tuke et al., 44 N. E. 2d 748
(Ohio), the court stated as follows:
In such a proceeding, there are no formal
pleadings or definite issues, which admit of affirmation upon one side and denial upon the
other, and hence the doctrine of "burden of
proof" has no application.
The jury acts merely as an appraising or
assessing board, determining the fair market
value of the property from all the evidence submitted.
In Bank of Edenton et al. v. United States, 152
F. 2d 251, the court states as follows, to wit:
It may be noted that the entire concept of
burden of proof does not lend itself too readily to
application in condemnation proceedings, and, in
at least one jurisdiction, has been entirely rejected."
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The jury could not have been misled in this case.
Respondents opened the case and presented their evidence first. They assumed the role of a plaintiff throughout the case, meeting the burden of carrying forward the
evidence. At page 331 of the transcript Mr. Behle, for
respondents, says:
"The plaintiff rests—rather, the defendant
rests; the defendant being in the nature of the
plain tiff."
The verdict of the jury was nearer to the valuation
of respondents' witnesses than to those given by witnesses for appellant, indicating that it was more convinced by their testimony.

Bank of Edenton et al. v. United States, supra, is
similar to the case at bar. There, not only did the court
refuse to place the burden of proof upon defendant, but
expressly instructed the jury that the government had
the burden. In holding the error immaterial, the court
said:
The majority rule, which has been generally
adopted in the federal courts, places the burden of
proof of value in condemnation proceedings upon
the landowner. A number of jurisdictions, however, follow a contrary view and place the burden
upon the condemnor. (Citations listed.) The record does not show which practice is customary in
the State courts of North Carolina. But, in any
case, the assignment of the burden of proof to the
government is not a material error. (Italics ours.)
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In Malvin v. County of Blue Earth, 46 N. W. 2d 464
(Minn.) the court held that the failure of the court to
instruct as to Burden of Proof was not a reversible
error. The court states:
We are of the opinion that the omission was
not prejudicial. The only question submitted to
the jury was the amount of benefits and damages.
Damages and benefits m some amount must be
conceded. The sole question was how much. The
testimony of the county's witnesses and those who
appeared for respondents was so far apart that it
appears to have been largely a question of which
group of witnesses the jury would believe. We do
not feel that the jury's verdict would have been
different if the court had instructed that the burden of proof rested on respondents. (Italics ours.)

Wiegand v. Siddons, 41 Appeal Oases, Dist. of Columbia (Tucker 1919-13) 130, is also similar to the case
at bar. In that jurisdiction, the burden of proof was
upon the government. However, the trial court refused
to grant an instruction placing the burden upon the District of Columbia. In that case, as in the case at bar, the
party with the burden assumed it and went forward with
the evidence. In holding the error non-prejudicial the
court said:
In the absence, therefore, of any showing
that the assessment was inequitable or arbitrary,
we must hold that the refusal of the court to
grant the instruction in question was not so prejudicial to appellants as to justify a reversal of
the judgment.
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It is submitted that the proposed instruction in question was properly refused. Although in this state the
burden of proof as to value is on the defendant, this instruction does not properly assign it. The last sentence
of said instruction was unnecessary. It stated as follows: (R. 57)
Therefore, if you believe that all the evidence
is evenly balanced, you will reject the propositions advanced by the defendant as to value, and
as to damages, and will accept those advanced by
plaintiff.
It created a real danger of confusing the trier of fact and
was properly refused.
It is further submitted that even if it was error to
refuse the instruction, such error in no way prejudiced
the State of Utah. Defendants assumed the burden. The
owners were treated as a plaintiff throughout the trial.
That the jury fully understood its function is indicated by
the following (comparable figures for the other two
property items valued by the jury have been given at the
opening of this brief):

Parcel 2.
Kiepe ...
Ashton
Solomon

State
Estate
..$56,500.00 (R. 361) Wright
$115,000.00 (R. 183)
.. 71,320.00 (R. 439) Wallace
107,000.00 (R. 252)
.. 92,500.00 (R. 474) Benedict
107,000.00 (R. 287)
Jury's Verdict $91,500.00 (R. 93)

Parcel 3.
Kiepe
Ashton
-Solomon

$56,400.00 (R. 358) Wright
.....$75,000.00 (R. 184)
73,090.00 (R. 440) Wallace
72,700.00 (R. 254)
58,500.00 (R. 474) Benedict
76,700.00 (R. 288)
Jury's Verdict $70,000.00 (R. 93)
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Obviously the jury below was most conservative, and
in reaching its own independent justment as to the values
involved, in each case used a figure somewhat less than
the highest estimate of the State's own expert appraisers.
The verdict would have been no different had the omitted
sentence in the requested instruction been given. The
award was neither arbitrary nor inequitable, but was
entirely fair and reasonable under the evidence.

The jury was not misled by the alleged error; it
was charged to " determine separately the value of each
of the four items * * * and from the evidence in the
case, viewed and construed in the light of the law as
given in these instructions, * * * return a verdict showing
the value you find as to each parcel or item, and the
total of all." (R. 82) Precisely this, the jury did. (R
93) The trial court committed no prejudicial error.

Point 7.
The court properly included and computed interest in
the judgment below.

In considering this final point raised by the State
in appealing from the judgment of compensation below,
we understand that there is no controversy as to the
following:
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1. Defendants' property was actually taken, as
determined by this court in State v. Peek, supra, by final
judgment of condemnation duly made, entered and recorded May 27, 1952 (E, 43-51); whereupon legal title
to the property so taken vested by operation of law in
the State of Utah for the purpose of the State Park
(Sec. 78-34-15, U.C.A. '53).

2. Subject to other points raised by this appeal and
exclusive of interest, these defendants are entitled to
receive as compensation the sum of $632,145.00. This
amount is "the total fair market value on the 12th day
of July, 1951 of the property of the defendants named
herein taken by the State of Utah by said judgment of
taking dated May 27, 1952 and all severance damages
resulting from such taking." (E. 98; Sec. 78-34-11,
U.C.A. 1953.)

3. As a condition precedent to the entering of the
statutory "final judgment of condemnation," defendants
pursuant to Sec. 76-34-16, U.C.A. 1953 filled "an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding except
as to the amount of damages * * * in event that a new
trial shall be granted." At that time the judgment of
compensation as first made and entered herein on May
13, 1952 was in the sum of $495,875.00. (E. 43)
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4. Responsive to mandate of this court issued in
P&ek v. the District Court, Case No. 7860, on January 5,
1953 there was paid to these defendants, respondents
herein, the "upset price" for their land so taken of
$495,874.00. (R. 98) Mt. Shasta Power Corporation v.
Dennis, 225 Pac 877 (Calif.).
5. On appeal from the first judgment of compensation of May 13, 1952 that judgment was reversed in
Peek v. State, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630; and upon
retrial of the sole remaining issues of value in the condemnation proceedings, the judgment from which the
present appeal is taken was entered November 5, 1954.
(R. 99) As stated above, thereby defendants' damages
for their land taken and their severance damages were
determined to be $632,145.00, resulting from the State's
final Judgment of Taking of May 27, 1952. (R. 98)
6. In addition, and as part of the constitutional and
statutory requirements of an award of "just compensation," defendants are entitled to interest thereon at least
from the date of actual legal taking, namely, from May
27, 1952 rather than the date when summons was served.
(Peek v. State, supra.)
7. As to the interest rate to be allowed, under Section 15-0-4 the legal rate for judgments as construed
by this court in the Danielson case is eight per cent;
otherwise the legal rate under Section 15-0-1 is six per
cent.
58
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judge Martin M. Larson, the trial judge here
responsible for computing interest on the award for the
property taken from respondents on May 27, 1952, was
not confronted with the problem in the Danielson case,
247 P. 2d 900, which as a recent pronouncement of this
court was well in mind. Here we had no "mere interlocutory order,'' with neither a taking, nor a definitive
determination that the property would be taken, as was
the mandate of the Utah Legislature concerning the
Monument Park area.

Nor was there here involved a mere "final order"
as appellant mis-states on page 52 of its brief. Legal
title had here actually passed irrevocably, at the State's
own election, on May 27, 1952 when the court below made
and entered its "Final Judgment of Condemnation."
When the State that day recorded this Final Judgment,
title passed to it from the owners by operation of law.
Sec. 78-34-15. The wording "Final Judgment" is that of
the same legislature which has said that in the case of
a "judgment," interest shall accrue at eight per cent.

After this taking and passing
owners so deprived on that date of
then on had no defense. They had
under both the State Constitution

of title, the former
their property from
the monetary right,
and the Fourteenth
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Amendment to the Federal Constitution, to receive
$632,145.00 for the taking of their property, together with
the right to interest accruing between time of taking and
date of payment for the period when they were also
deprived of the required compensation for the value of
their property so taken.

Under these circumstances the trial court held that
an entirely different situation from that of the Danielson
case was involved. Accordingly the court computed interest at the judgment rate from May 27, 1952. This of
course was the date when the property was taken by the
final judgment; as of that date the sum of $632,145.00
became due and owing defendants for the property then
so taken.

Such interest as of January 5, 1953, when partial
payment was first made under mandate of this court
in Case No. 7866, amounted to $31,888.09, as recited
in the judgment below. (R. 99) Thus at this latter date,
the State of Utah owed the Deere Estate the sum of
$664,033.09, principal and interest.

Then the trial court credited that amount with the
partial payment of $495,875.00, leaving a balance still
owing the former owners for their property taken May
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27, 1952 of $168,158.09. Interest on that balance had
accrued to November 5, 1954 in the sum of $24,663.10.
This was properly added to the unpaid principal balance
to determine the total owing to the defendants as of that
latter date. Judgment for the total accordingly was so
made and entered. (R. 99)

It is submitted that the trial court followed the
statutes and Constitution of the State of Utah and the
requirements of the Constitution of the United States
in so including and computing interest on the award.
Thus only can appellant compensate the former owners,
not only for the value of the property taken from them
by the State of Utah, but for the delays they have
encountered in receiving payment since they were deprived of their property on May 27, 1952.

IV. CONCLUSION

On this fourth proceeding before the Supreme Court
of Utah involving a relatively simple condemnation case,
this controversy between the State of Utah and the
owners whose property it voluntarily took should finally
be put at rest. As to the judgment of just compensation
from which this appeal is taken, it is respectfully sub*
mitted that:
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1. No error was committed below as to the admission or rejection of evidence.
2. The jury was properly and fairly instructed by
the learned trial judge, and performed its function and
duty in determining the four remaining factual issues in
this extended litigation.
3. Interest on the award since the actual legal taking
of defendants' property on May 27, 1952 was properly
included and computed.
4. The judgment of compensation from which this
appeal was taken was duly and regularly made and
entered.
It is respectfully submitted that this judgment
should be forthwith affirmed, costs to respondents.

C. C. PARSONS,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
KEITH E. TAYLOR,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents.
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